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THE SCOPE OF MORTGAGE LIENS ON FIXTURES AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN NEW YORK
MILTON R. FPRIEDMAN'
OCCUPYING a twilight zone between real and personal property the
area of fixtures is one which defies precise metes and bounds. The
subject of fixtures involves the right to remove, or prevent the removal
of, articles installed in realty. The mortgagee's question is whether he
succeeds, on foreclosure of a real property mortgage, to the articles in
question or may restrain their removal prior thereto on the ground that
such removal would constitute waste as against the mortgage interest.
The landlord's question is whether he succeeds, on expiration of the
demised term, to articles installed by the tenant or whether these are
subject to removal by the tenant. The articles in issue may be subject
to interests in favor of conditional vendors and chattel mortgagees, who
may further complicate the problem by failing to comply with the filing
or recordation requirements. Such failure may shift an initial priority
of right to a bona fide purchaser for value. Contractors, laborers and
materialmen, by contributing services and materials, may obtain rights
to mechanics' liens as against an owner consenting thereto, without
necessarily obtaining a priority over all other parties in interest. The
mixture of priorities, thus made possible, may create a "three cornered
equity"--a situation where A's equities are prior to B's, B's are prior
to C's, but C's are prior to As.1
The common law rules of fixtures have been substantially overridden
by the use of present day mortgage forms, designed to cover installed
property by contract, and by various statutory provisions which will be
discussed herein. This paper will first discuss the common law rules
and then consider the effect of the contractual and statutory provisions.
Common Law of Fixtures
The problem of fixtures is not new. To begin with, the terms them-
selves are confusing. "Fixture", when used in connection with mort-
gagors and mortgagees, heirs and executors, and vendors and vendees
of realty, refers to an article that goes with the land and is irremovable.
"Trade fixture", when used in connection with landlord and tenant,
refers to an article which the tenant may remove. Respectable au-
thorities have said that all articles attached to realty are presumably
fixtures, and that the right of removal is the exception rather than the
rule. - Yet against this one may place a decision in 15061 upholding
I Member of the New York and the Connecticut Bar.
1. Cf. note 114, infra.
2. See Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287, 294 (1869); Tifft v. Horton, S3 N. Y. 377,
382 (1873). 2 Km'T, Comm. (2d ed. 1832) 343.
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the right of a grantor of realty to remove the window glass on the
ground that "a house is a perfect house without glass", though, to be
sure, this gave way to Herlakenden's Case4 where a contrary rule was
enunciated. Kent5 pays lip service to the doctrine of irremovability but
says this rule was so worn away that removability became the rule
rather than the exception. But it is to be noted that Kent was con-
sidering the tenant's right of removal. He later concedes that irre-
movability is the general characteristic of fixtures as between vendor
and vendee, mortgagor and mortgagee, and heir and executor.0
It is stated generally that there are three classes of articles affixed
to buildings,' i.e., first, those, like bricks in a wall," invariably part of
the realty; second, those definitively chattels, of which gas ranges and
refrigerators are given as the usual examples; and a third class, which
may be either, depending upon the intention of the parties. The first
class gives rise to few problems, and discussion thereof, except by way
of dictum, is rare. The third class, and, possibly the second, represent
shifting concepts. This generalization, in a rough sort of way, will
reconcile many of the decisions.
In the mortgage cases, it may be stated generally, there is a growing
tendency to hold as fixtures the third class-the articles whose status
is subject to the intent of the parties. When, sixty or seventy years ago,
new devices were introduced into buildings, the original tendency was
to treat them as removable chattels. As their use became more common
this trend changed and the tendency became to regard them as part of
the realty.
Indicative of the shifting of the concept of fixtures is the history of
the legal treatment accorded to such devices.' In 1880 the Court of
Appeals'" ruled that, though gas pipes were fixtures, gas fixtures thereto
attached were but chattels. It was found that the fixtures were merely
screwed on to the pipes impermanently and easily detachable. Other
early cases held that gas fixtures were "merely a part of the furniture
3. Y. B. 21 (1506).
4. 4 Co. Rep. 62, 76 Eng. Rep. 1025 (1589). "For without glass it's no perfect house."
5. 2 KENT, CO . (2d ed. 1832) 343.
6. Id. at 346.
7. See M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 59 F. (2d)- 1001, 1002 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932); Madfes v. Beverly Development Corporation, 251 N. Y. 12, 15, 166 N. E. 787, 788
(1929). Chasnov v. Marlane Holding Co., Inc., 137 Misc. 332, 334-335, 244 N. Y. Supp,
455, 459 (Mun. Ct. 1930).
8. See Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344, 350-351 (1859); Davis v. Bliss, 187 N. Y. 77, 83,
79 N. E. 851, 853 (1907).
9. See SCHWARTZ, REAL EsTATE MAxUAL (1937) 75, for a list of personal property the
attorney for the purchaser of realty is advised to include in a contract of sale.
10. McKeage v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 81 N. Y. 38 (1880).
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of the room... a substitute for lamps and lamp holders, candle-sticks
and chandeliers, formerly used to hold candles.""
The earlier Massachusetts cases laid considerable stress upon inten-
tion. In McConnell v. Blood," it was said:
"Whatever is placed in a building by the mortgagor to carry out the obvious
purpose for which it was erected, or to permanently increase its value for oc-
cupation, becomes a part of the realty, though not so fastened that it cannot
be removed without serious injury either to itself or to the building. On the
other hand, articles which are put in merely as furniture are removable, though
more or less substantially fastened to the building."
This was followed by Hook v. Boltoti'3 which contains clearer im-
plications that the articles that "go with the house" would be deemed
fixtures. It was there said: 14
"The gas stove and the window shades, running on rollers, stand differently.
It may be that certain apartment houses, or other dwelling houses designed
for occupation by tenants, are constructed in some of our cities and intended
to be used in such a way that the introduction of such gas stoves and window
shades by the owner, to go with the house as a part of it, for use by the
tenants, may hereafter be proved at a trial. See Jennings v. Vahey, 183 Mlass.
47, 66 N. E. 598, 97 Am. St. Rep. 409. It is entirely possible that the mode
of construction and use of certain kinds of houses may be such that articles
of this kind will be made a part of the house for permanent retention and use
in the places where they are put. If it becomes a practice to build and use
houses in such a way these articles may be put in as fixtures."
New York has adopted the yardstick for fixtures laid down in the
oft-cited decision of Teaff v. Hewitt,' with its three-fold requirement:
(1) actual annexation to the freehold of a chattel appurtenant thereto;
(2) adaptability for use thereof in connection with the freehold; and
(3) an intention of making the same a permanent accession to the free-
hold. Nevertheless, in the determination of removability many expres-
sions of the Court of Appeals, similar to those of Massachusetts, indi-
cate that, of those requirements, intent is to be underscored. These cases
indicate that the object, and not the method, of attachment is controlling,
and that an immovable character may be attributed to a movable ob-
ject. In the mortgage cases removability is not the sole criterion. 7
11. Capehart v. Foster, 61 M inn. 132, 63 N. .W. 257 (1895); Araughan v. Haldeman,
33 Pa. 522 (1859).
12. 123 Mass. 47 (1877).
13. 199 Mass. 244, 85 N. E. 175 (1908).
14. See id. at 247, 85 N. E. at 176 (1908).
15. Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287 (1869); see Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 273,
282 (1872); McRea v. Central National Bank, 66 N. Y. 489, 496 (1876).
16. 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
17. In re Walker Bin Co., 9 F. Supp. 367 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
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In Potter v. Cromwell"8 it was said:
"That it was the permanent and habitual annexation, and not the manner
of fastening that determined when the article annexed became a part of the
realty."
The Court quoted with approval from Winslow v. Merchants Insurance
Company'9 that essential parts of a mill and adapted to and used in
connection with it "'though not at the time of the conveyance or mort-
gage attached to the mill, are yet a part of it, and pass with it by a
conveyance, mortgage or attachment' "o .and continued:
"the permanency of the attachment does not depend so much upon the degree
of physical force with which the thing is attached, as upon the motive and
intention of the parties in attaching it. If the article is attached for temporary
use, with the intention of removing it, a mortgagee cannot interfere with its
removal by the mortgagor. If it is placed there for the permanent improve-
ment of the freehold he may."
Similar expressions are found in Voorhees v. McGinnis21 and McRea v.
Central National Bank.
22
Annexation in these cases, it would seem, is regarded more as evi-
dence of intent than as a requirement in itself. In Snedeker v. Warring,2=
it was said:
"Its character may depend much upon the object of its erection. Its destina-
tion, the intent of the person making the erection, after exercising a controlling
influence, and its connection with the land is looked at principally for the
purpose of ascertaining that intent...
Storm doors and screens designed to fit a particular building, though
used only seasonably and stored otherwise, have been held fixtures as
between mortgagor and mortgagee.2 4
18. 40 N. Y. 287 (1869).
19. 4 Metc. 306 (Mass. 1842).
20. Italics supplied. Where machinery has been held to be a fixture, spare parts or
movable parts used in connection therewith, not actually annexed, have been held fixtuves
where their removal would leave the principal parts unfit for use and where the removable
parts are not capable of general use elsewhere. There are apparently no New York cases
directly in point. See Bishop v. Bishop, 11 N. Y. 123 (1854) (hop poles removed
during off season, held fixtures); Hoyle v. Plattsburgh Montreal R.R., 54 N. Y. 315, 323
(1873). And see Notes (1937) 109 A. L. R. 1424, (1937) 69 L. R. A. 892, 893-894. But
articles placed upon the land with the intention of annexing the same are generally not
deemed fixtures until annexation. See Notes (1937) 69 L. R. A. 892, (1908) 15 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 727.
21. 48 N. Y. 278, 283, 284 (1872).
22. 66 N. Y. 489, 495, 497 (1876).
23. 12 N. Y. 170 (1854).
24. See Note (1911) 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1189. In Durkee v. Powell, 75 App. Div.
176, 77 N. Y. Supp. 368 (3d Dep't 1902), roller shades were held personalty as a matter
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The "intent", so discussed, is not a subjective intent but a conclusion
of law to be deduced from a certain course of action. Thus, it has been
said that the character of fixtures "could be neither established or taken
away by the simple declarations of the proprietor, whether oral or
written",2" that "the mere declaration of the owner that be intends
that they shall go with the house does not make them realty"2 and that
a mortgagor "seldom has any special intent".2 7
Nevertheless, these expressions, treating the factor of annexation so
cavalierly, must be accepted with caution. The Swdekcr case involved
a monument of substantial proportions and there is little doubt that
Parker, J. did not overlook its effective attachment by gravity alonep
and the other cases cited involved machinery in factories fastened by
weight and attachments if only to steady the same against vibration.
The actual holdings warrant no conclusion that unattached articles
would at that time have been held fixtures. In fact, a distinction has
been drawn between the machinery necessary to make a building, in
general, a factory and that necessary to make it a particdar kind of
factory. Thus, equipment such as boilers, engines, elevators, shafting,
sprinkler system and switch boxes have been held to be part of the
realty and covered by a mortgage lien, whereas the machines used in
connection therewith for operating a woodworking plant have been held
to be removable chattels.20
The requirement of "permanence" in installation is one not difficult
to fulfill. It is satisfied, inasmuch as the articles from their nature
cannot last as long as the building,31 if the goods are "placed there with
of law. The opinion states that the status of window and door screens as between mort-
gagor and mortgagee is a matter of intent but holds, upon the record before it, that the
intent was that these articles be personalty.
25. See Snedeker v. Warring, 12 N. Y. 170, 177 (1854).
26. See McKeage v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 38, 41 (ISSO).
27. See Voorhees v. McGinnis, 4S N. Y. 278, 286 (1872).
28. "It is said the statues and sphinxes of colossal size, which adorn the avenue lead-
ing to the temple of Karnak at Thebes, are secured on their solid foundations only by
their own weight ... if a traveller should purchase from Mehemet Ali the land on which
these interesting ruins rest, it would seem quite absurd to bold that the deed did not cover
the statues still standing, and to claim that they were still unadministered personal aszets
of the Ptolomies after an annexation of such long duration. No legal distinction can be
made between the sphinxes of Thebes and the statue of [the mortgagor]. Both were
erected for ornament and the latter was as colossal in size and as firmly annexed to the
land as the former, and by the same means." 12 N. Y. 170, 179 (1854).
29. Factory machinery has been held a suffident part of the realty to predicate a
mechanic's lien upon its installation. Watts-Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 12S N. Y. 1, 25
N. E. 1060 (IS90) (gas compressor, engine, oil traps, foundation plates).
30. See In re Walker Bin Co., 9 F. Supp. 367 (W. D. N. Y. 1935) and cases there
collected; cf. text at p. 335-336, supra.
31. Berliner v. Piqua Club Ass'n, 32 Misc. 470, 66 N. Y. Supp. 791 (Sup. Ct. 1899),
aff'd, 73 App. Div. 622, 76 N. Y. Supp. 671 (Ist Dep't 1900).
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the intention of then remaining there until worn out, or in the expres-
sion used, 'superceded' by which I take it was meant until in the progress
of invention better and more suitable machinery should be produced.
That thereby became a part of the permanent plant of the company,
proper and necessary for it to have in order to carry on its corporate
business." 2
Unique buildings and "specialties" afford additional evidence of the
effect of intent in the determination of fixtures. Where a building cannot
be used for designed and unique purposes without the use of certain
personal property, objects therein installed and appropriate for the de-
signed use are held to be fixtures despite a flimsy mode of annexation.
Thus, seats in a theatre3 3 and shelves in a library34 have been held fix-
tures and in Szuchs v. Toth"5 the same was determined with respect to
pews and a bell in a church. The mortgage in the Szuchs case, though
recent, contained no contractual provisions covering personal property,
making it clear beyond peradventure that the decision was refted upon
the ground that the objects were fixtures. These cases show that, given
a manifest intent that the articles remain until worn out or superceded,
the mode of annexation will be accorded slight significance.
Any suggestion, however, that unattached or slightly attached articles
will be held fixtures for all purposes, was arrested by the Madjes case,39
a decision sharply emphasizing the continuing vitality of the common
law rules. The Madjes case was a conflict, in a foreclosure action, be-
tween a mortgagee and a conditional vendor who installed gas ranges
without properly filing his contract before recordation of the mortgage.
The vendor prevailed, on the ground that the ranges were and remained
personalty unaffected by the lien of the plaintiff's mortgage. Personal
Property Law, Section 67, was held inapplicable. Had the court held,
as the plaintiff strenuously argued, that the ranges were so affixed to the
realty as to become a part thereof, even though severable without ma-
terial injury to the freehold, Section 67 of the Personal Property Law
would have impelled a decision that the plaintiff, as mortgagee, became
a bona fide purchaser of the ranges when obtaining his mortgage. The
actual holding of the Madjes case is that gas ranges and kindred articles
32. N. Y. Security & Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas and Electric Light Co., 88 Hun 569,
34 N. Y. Supp. 890 (Sup. Ct. 1895), aff'd, 157 N. Y. 689, 51 N. E. 1092 (1898).
33. Bender v. King, 111 Fed. 60, aff'd, 116 Fed. 813 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902), cert. denied,
187 U. S. 643 (1902); In re Albanese, 44 F. (2d) 602 (N. D. N. Y. 1930) (collecting cases);
Pike v. Naylon Securities Co., 140 Misc. 734, 251 N. Y. Supp. 659 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
34. Rieser v. Commeau, 129 App. Div. 490, 114 N. Y. Supp. 154 (2d Dep't 1908),
aff'd, 198 N. Y. 560, 92 N. E. 1100 (1910). And see Note (1913) 43 L. R. A. (x. s.) 675.
35. N. Y. L. J. Dec. 19, 1934, p. 2472, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.). Contra as to pews: Diamond
v. Art Contracting, Inc., 147 Misc. 88, 262 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (failure to
establish intent).
36. Madfes v. Beverly Development Co., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929).
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do not, even after annexation, become part of the realty under the com-
mon law of fixtures and that reservation of title under an unfiled condi-
tional sale is not void as against a bona fide purchaser of realty (which
includes a mortgagee).
Judge Crane dissented vigorously when the Madjes decision was
handed down. He argued that the decisions upon which the majority
opinion relied were rendered when gas ranges and similar articles were
belongings of tenants and "customarily carted about by the tenant from
place to place", that "the mode of living did not make the cook stove
the almost universal equipment of houses and apartments supplied by
the landlord". He continued: 37
"But there comes a time when the law must keep abreast of the changes
in social conditions; when we as judges must recognize the circumstances under
which the business of housing is now conducted... today people live in apart-
ments ... massive affairs.... They are equipped with modem improvements.
.. The gas range or cook stove and electric light fixtures and ice boxes are
now common in most every apartment. The tenants do not furnish these things;
they are considered as part of the realty and are so treated by every owner
and by the tenants.... The mortgagee would be startled if all the ranges and
radiators were removed by the mortgagor ... it is only a fiction of law which
considers them under certain circumstances as strictly personal property."
Judge Cardozo, who voted with the majority, has made it clear, in a
published address,3 s that the majority of the court agreed with the dis-
senting opinion. A contrary conclusion, said Judge Cardozo, "has an
aspect unreal and almost farcical when applied to apartment life to-
day."39 What was the court to do, however:
" . . bearing in mind the fact that sellers of the ranges under contracts of
conditional sale had made their sales in the faith that the ranges were per-
sonalty merely, and had refrained from taking measures to protect themselves
by recording their bills of sale in ways that would have been appropriate if
they had supposed that the ranges were annexations to the land? Well, a
majority of the court believed that in view of the probable reliance by innocent
parties upon a decision whicl the same majority would have refuscd to wahe
if the question had been a new one, there was nothing to do except to adhere
to what its predecessors had done, and let stare decisis control the judgment"3.'
Subsequently, a lower court distinguished the Mad! es case, and held
gas ranges fixtures where the name of the apartment house was burned
into them.'
37. Id. at 22, 166 N. E. at 790 (1929).
38. Cardozo, The Stare Decisis of the Future (1932) 55 N. Y. S. B. A. R1'. 293.
39. Id. at 295.
40. Id. at 295, 296. Italics supplied.
41. Prudential Insurance Company v. Sanford Real Estate Corp., 157 Misc. 563, 284
N. Y. Supp. 73, aff'd, 246 App. Div. 567, 282 N. Y. Supp. 840 (4th Dcp't 1935). Thi
1938]
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The term "fixtures" is a variable concept-variable not only with
respect to time, but also with respect to the class of persons interested.
As between mortgagor and mortgagee and vendor and vendee, the same
rules apply.42 But these concepts do not of necessity prevail between
life tenant and remaindermen, 43 heirs and personal representatives,44
or landlord and tenant.45 As between the latter, two separate types of
fixtures are recognized.46 When the attachment is made by a tenant for
case construes together fixtures and articles covered by a personal property clause. Its
authority is, therefore, not clear.
42. McFadden v. Allen, 134 N. Y. 489, 32 N. E. 21 (1892); Snedeker v. Warring,
12 N. Y. 170 (1854); Davidson v. Westchester Gas-Light Co., 99 N. Y. 558 (1885);
Pfluger v. Carmichael, 54 App. Div. 153, 66 N. Y. Supp. 417 (2d Dep't 1900).
43. EwEL, Fr ruRxs (2d ed. 1905) 264.
44. See Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287, 297 (1869); Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y.
278, 284 (1872); McRea v. Central National Bank, 66 N. Y. 489, 495 (1876).
45. Snedeker v. Warring, 12 N. Y. 170, 174 (1854); Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y.
278, 283 (1872); New York Security & Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas Co., 88 Hun 569, 34
N. Y. Supp. 890, aff'd, 157 N. Y. 689, 51 N. E. 1092 (1898).
46. The determination of fixtures as between landlord and tenant is vely liberal toward
the tenant. Davidson v. Westchester Gas-Light Co., 99 N. Y. 558, 2 N. E. 892 (1885);
Matter of City of New York, 192 N. Y. 295, 84 N. E. 1105 (1908). Generally, the tenant
may remove trade fixtures [Ombony v. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234 (1859)] if this can be done
without substantial injury to the freehold, but it is not essential that the fixtures them-
selves have a removable entity. Matter of City of New York, supra, at 302, 84 N. E. at
1107; Cohen v. Wittemann, 100 App. Div. 338, 91 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1st Dep't 1905).
But even an express right of removal has been held not to permit injury to the freehold.
Davies v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 272 N. Y. 572, 4 N. E. (2d) 742 (1934). It has been held
that a refrigerating system extending through a building, installed by a tenant in the whole-
sale poultry business, is not removable as a trade fixture. Matter of City of New York,
101 App. Div. 527, 92 N. Y. Supp. 8 (1st Dep't 1905), but banking fixtures, cages,
mahogany booths, etc. have been held removable. Bee Building Co. v. Daniel, 57 F. (2d)
59 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) and cf. note 49. A tenant's machinery, as well as Its standard
interchangeable spare parts, is normally treated as personalty. Matter of City of New
York (Whitlock Ave.), 278 N. Y. 276, 16 N. E. (2d) 281 (1938). For a general discussion
of tenant's removable trade fixtures, see McADAm., LANDLORD & TEANT (5th ed. 1934)
§ 203, et seq. Articles which would ordinarily be construed to be trade fixtures, but which
have been attached to replace essential articles installed by the landlord, are not lemovable
by the tenant despite an outstanding interest therein by third persons. See Bartholomay
Brewing Co. v. Davenport, 158 App. Div. 47, 142 N. Y. Supp. 960 (3d Dep't 1913), and
cases there collected, and cf. text at p. 358.
A tenant with a light of removal is held to lose the same, on the theory of implied
surrender, by renewal of the lease without reservation of the right of removal. Loughran
v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792 (1871); Talbot v. Cruger, 151 N. Y. 117, 45 N. E. 364 (1896);
Stephens v. Ely, 162 N. Y. 79, 56 N. E. 499 (1900); Precht v. Howard, 187 N. Y. 136,
79 N. E. 847 (1907). Most states follow this rule. See Notes (1906) 1 L. R. A. (N. s.)
1192, (1909) 17 L. R. A. (N. S.)' 1135, (1914) 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 294. It is justified upon
the ground that, after expiration, the landlord ought not to be compelled to permit entry
of the tenant for the purpose of repossessing himself of his belongings. Lewis v. Ocean
N. & P. Co., 125 N. Y. 341, 26 N. E. 301 (1891). The minority rule is based upon the
absurdity of the presumption that a renewal lease, silent on the question of fixtures,
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purposes of trade, mere attachment is insufficient to destroy the movable
character of the articles so attached.47 The tenant is presumed, because
constitutes an "abandonment" without interruption of possession. Kerr v. King/bury, 39
Mich. 150, 33 Am. Rep. 362 (1910); Second National Bank v. 0. E. Merrill Co., 69 Wis.
501, 34 N. W. 514 (1887); Wittemneyer v. Board of Education, 10 Ohio C. Ct. 119 (1895).
Even where followed the rule has been criticised as technical. It has not been applied
where a tenant held over without a new agreement after expiration of the term [Lewis
v. Ocean N. & P. Co., supra; Debobes v. Burtterly, 210 App. Div. 50, 205 N. Y. Supp. 104
(1st Dep't 1924)], or to an extension of the lease [Clarke v. Howland, 85 N. Y. 204
(1881); Howe's Cave Ass'n v. Houch, 66 Hun 205, affd, 141 N. Y. 605, 36 N. E. 740
(1894)], despite an agreement to pay a higher rent [Crater's Wharf, Inc. v. Valvoline Oil
Co., 204 App. Div. 840, 196 N. Y. Supp. 815 (2d Dep't 1922)].
It has not been applied to trade fixtures [Barth v. Koch, 203 App. Div. 62, 196 N. Y.
Supp. 290 (lst Dep't 1922); Smusch v. Kohn, 22 Misc. 344, 49 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup.
Ct. 1914); see Crater's Wharf, Inc. v. Valvoline Oil Co., 204 App. Div. 840, 841, 196
N. Y. Supp. 815, 816 (2d Dep't 1922); cf. Mass. Nat. Bank v. Shinn, 18 App. Div. 276,
46 N. Y. Supp. 329 (2d Dep't 1897), affd, 163 N. Y. 360, 57 N. E. 611 (1900)], or where
the new lease expressly negatived any abandonment of fixtures by the tenant [Livingston
v. Sulzer, 19 Hun 375 (N. Y. 1879)]. A tenant's right of removal has been upheld
against a subsequent tenant. Stone v. National Surgical Stores, Inc., 193 N. Y. Supp. 634
(Sup. Ct. 1922).
In condemnation, trade fixtures, though personalty as between the landlord and tenant,
and removable by the tenant, are held realty as to the condemning party and subject to
compensation as such; but this applies only to such trade fixtures as are deemed part of
the realty within Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp., supra; Matter of City of New
York (Whiflock Ave.), 278 N. Y. 276, 16 N. E. (2d) 281 (1933); Matter of City of
New York, 256 N. Y. 236, 176 N. E. 377 (1931); Matter of City of New York (Tri-
borough Bridge), 249 App. Div. 579, 293 N. Y. Supp. 223 (1st Dep't 1937); Matter of
City of New York (Woolhiser), 250 App. Div. 197, 293 N. Y. Supp. 850 (2d Dep't 1937).
Where the tenant expressly agrees that "all alterations, additions and improvements" should
become the property of the landlond, it would seem that such a covenant would suparsede
the law of fixtures. The clause has been held to add to the landlord's common law rights.
Excelsior Brewing Co. v. Smith, 125 App. Div. 663, 110 N. Y. Supp. 8 (2d Dep't 1903),
aff'd, 198 N. Y. 519, 92 N. E. 1034 (1910). It has been given a comprehensive meaning
in the landlord's favor. Reber v. Conway, 203 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913); French v.
Mayor, 29 Barb. 363 (N. Y. 1859). See In re Lexington Motors Co., 294 Fed. 233
(C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Levin v. Improved Property Holding Co., 141 App. Div. 105, 120
N. Y. Supp. 963 (2d Dep't 1910); Center v. Everard, 19 MIsc. 156, 43 N. Y. Supp. 416
(Sup. Ct. 1897); Bigalke & Eckert Co. v. Knabe & Co. Mfg. Co., 65 Alisc. 29, 119 N. Y.
Supp. 1114 (Sup. Ct. 1909). Nevertheless, McAdam, J., in Smusch v. Kohn, 22 Misc. 344,
49 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. CL 1914), virtually nullified the clause by construing it to refer
only to changes and additions to the freehold. This approach was followed in Century
Holding Co. v. Pathe Exchange Inc., 200 App. Div. 62, 192 N. Y. Supp. 383 (1st Dep't
1922); Webber v. Franklin Brewing Co., 123 App. Div. 465, 103 N. Y. Supp. 251 (1t
Dep't 1903), affd, 198 N. Y. 509, 92 N. E. 1106 (1910); United Booking Offices v. Pitts-
burgh Life & Trust Co., 65 Misc. 31, 119 N. Y. Supp. 216 (Sup. Ct. 1909); and Metro-
politan Concert Co. v. Sperry, 120 N. Y. 620, 23 N. E. 1152 (1890). Interesting, though
not pertinent to this paper, are the constructions placed upon N. Y. MuLTwi. Dv;r.rzo
LAw (1929) § 78 (requiring an owner to keep a multiple dwelling house "and every part
thereof" in repair).
47. See Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287, 295 (1869); Fo)rd v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344, 349
(1859); 2 Km;T, Coara. (2d ed. 1832) 343.
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of his temporary tenure, not to intend a permanent enhancement of the
value of the land;48 and fixtures installed by a tenant are removable
which, if installed by the owner, would become subject to a mortgage
lien. 9 In Tifft v. Horton,50 the Court of Appeals wrote:
"The general rules governing the rights of parties and chattels thus annexed
to the real estate rests, as it appears, upon the presumptions which the law
makes of what their purpose is in the act of annexation. This presumption
grows out of their relation to an interest in the land and not from the relation
or interest in it of others which may be opposite."'r"
The real property mortgage, without more, covers only realty 2 and
those fixtures which our discussion heretofore has shown to be irre-
movable and part of the realty. However, there is no relevant statute
as to what constitutes fixturesa and one must look for an answer to the
state decisions. These will be followed by the federal courts." Only
those involving mortgagor and mortgagee and vendor and vendee of
realty are pertinent. 5  The lien of the mortgage covers not only the
fixtures installed at the inception of the mortgage but those subsequently
installed. After-acquired fixtures are deemed to feed the mortgage lien
by accessionY0" It does not cover those articles deemed to retain their
character as personalty.
48. See Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377, 382 (1873). This does not apply to a case where
the tenant covenants, as part of the consideration of the lease, to erect improvements for
the landlord and leave the same on the premises upon the expiration of the lease. Scott
v. Have:straw Clay and Brick Co., 135 N. Y. 141, 31 N. E. 1102 (1892).
49. Pres. etc. Manhattan Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 252 App. Div. 863 (2d Dep't 1937)
(bank vault and night depository). And see Matter of Phillips & Ibsen, Inc., (unreported)
(S. D. N. Y. 1937); Note (1935) 98 A. L. R. 254.
50. 53 N. Y. 377, 383 (1873). Similar expressions occur in Matter of City of New
Yo:k, 256 N. Y. 236, 245, 247, 176 N. E. 377, 381 (1931), noted in (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 146;
TYLER, FXTURES (1877) 147.
51. Italics supplied.
52. McKeague v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 38 (1800); Cosgrove v. Troescher,
62 App. Div. 123, 70 N. Y. Supp. 764 (1st Dep't 1901); Cutler Mail Chute v. Crawford,
167 App. Div. 246, 152 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1st Dep't 1915) (deed); Micklas v. Pickford,
160 Misc. 254, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1058 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Newbrook Realty Co., Inc. v.
Frigidaire Sales Corporation, N. Y. L. J. Oct. 6, 1936 p. 1026, col. 6 (City Ct.). In re
Danville Hotel Co., 33 F. (2d) 162 (E. D. IUI. 1929) holds hotel carpets, specially fitted
and fastened, to be fixtures as to the mortgagee.
53. In re Walker Bin Co., 9 F. Supp. 367 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
54. Id.
55. For a discussion of articles generally covered by a real property mortgage, see
JoNEs, MoRTGAOEs (8th ed. 1928) § 530, et seq.
56. Matter of Phillips & Ibsen, Inc., (unreported) (S. D. N. Y. 1937); Snedeker v.
Warring, 12 N. Y. 170 (1854) ; Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377 (1873) ; Hoyle v. Plattsburgh &
Montreal R.R., 54 N. Y. 315, 323 (1873); Grown v. Keeney Settlement Cheese Ass'n,
59 N. Y. 242 (1874); McFadden v. Allen, 134 N. Y. 489, 32 N. E. 21 (1892); Gates v.
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Statutory and Contractual Provisions
Despite the growing use of personal property as the regular equip-
ment of various types of buildings prior to 1917, the mortgage forms
commonly in use until then did not, as a rule, purport to cover personal
property. Until then Real Property Law, Section 254,r which construes
mortgage clauses, referred only to "appurtenances". The 1917 amend-
ment5 s reads into the statutory form 9 of mortgages, as a part of the
description of the mortgaged premises, the phrase "together with all
fixtures and articles of personal property attached to or used in connec-
tion with the premises." The use of personal property clauses in
mortgages is now invariable. The commonly used provisions go fur-
ther than the statutory clause by purporting to cover after-acqzdred
personalty. A usual short-form clause is "Together with all fixtures and
articles of personal property, now or hereafter attached to, or used, in
connection with the premises . . . ." These clauses will hereinafter be
referred to as the "personal property clause" (derived out of Real Prop-
erty Law Section 254), or the "after-acquired personal property clause"
(incorporated by agreement of the parties).
These clauses attempt, by contract, to override the common law of
fixtures obtaining between mortgagor and mortgagee and create a dual-
natured mortgage covering realty (including fixtures) as well as per-
sonalty. Where the rights of third persons are not involved, the hybrid
mortgage is apt to be construed without regard to the distinction.cO
De La Mare, 142 N. Y. 397, 37 N. E. 121 (1894); Curry v. Geier Construction Co., 225
App. Div. 498, 234 N. Y. Supp. 59 (2d Dep't 1929). Thee cases hold that whenever,
subsequent to the maing of a mortgage, articles are annexed to the mortgaged premises
in such manner as to be deemed part thereof, such articles are, upon such installation,
covered by the mortgage. The term "accession" is used to characterize this proces and
is used herein solely in this sense and in disregard of its different meanings in other
branches of the law.
57. N. Y. LAws, 1909 c. 52.
58. N. Y. Aws, 1917 c. 6S2.
59. N. Y. REAL PRo,. LAw (1917) § 258, sets forth abbreviated forms of instruments
affecting 'eal property. The purpose is to shorten the form of such instruments and to
effect this purpose, the statute sets forth how the shorter forms recommended for use
shall be construed. The use of the statutory form is merely permissive and other forms
are not thereby invalidated. Goldbery v. Norek, 101 Missc. 371, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1023
(Sup. Ct. 1917); Rodler v. Pacht, 118 Mifsc. 331, 194 N. Y. Supp. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
A penalty of five dollars may be imposed for using the long form. N. Y. RmL Pnor. L,,w
(1896) § 327.
60. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Sanford Real Estate Corporation, 187 MiLc. 563,
565, 284 N. Y. Supp. 73, 76, af'd, 246 App. Div. 567, 282 N. Y. Supp. 840 (4th Dep't
1935), leave to appeal denied, 269 N. Y. 682 (1935), it was said: "Either as fixturw or
personal property attached to or used in connection with the premises, the following
property would seem to be covered.... Whether any of the v-arious articles be considered
real property or personal property, it is unimportant to decide."
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The validity of the dual-natured mortgage, insofar as it purports to
include chattels, is not free from question. Ordinarily, in New York,
chattel mortgages must be filed, and periodically refiled, in accordancd
with the requirement of the Lien Law.6 A section thereof, 2 however,
expressly provides that a mortgage covering realty and personalty, exe-
cuted by a corporation and securing bonds, 8 may be recorded as a real
property mortgage and need not be filed or refiled as a chattel mortgage.
It hag been questioned whether a single mortgage bond brought a cor-
porate mortgage within this section. The question has been answered
in the affirmative by the lower courts0 4 and the same result has tacitly
been assumed, though not expressly decided, by the Court of Appeals
in several cases." In apparently no case has the question been raised
in connection with a mortgage made by an individual and, therefore,
without the purview of Lien Law, Section 231. When the question arises
the same result may be reached on the ground that Real Property Law,
Section 254 expressly reads into every mortgage, drawn in statutory
form, a phrase including personalty "attached to or used in connection
with" the premises. Under well recognized rules of statutory construc-
tion that apparently conflicting statutes are to be construed in harmony
if possible 6 it may be that this section will be held applicable to real
property mortgages and Lien Law, Section 230 limited to exclusively
chattel mortgages. It is to be noted, however, that Real Property Law,
Section 254, in its present form, refers only to personal property existing
at the inception of the mortgage. It carries no reference to subsequently
acquired personalty.
61. N. Y. Lax LAW (1909) § 230.
62. N. Y. LmUr LAW (1909) § 231.
63. Zartman v. First National Bank, 189 N. Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907).
64. In re F. & D. Co., 256 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); Matter of Downtown Athletic
Club, 18 F. Supp. 712 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). Washington Mortgage Co. v. Forways Realty
Corp., 235 App. Div. 642, 255 N. Y. Supp. 110 (2d Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260 N. Y. 995,
184 N. E. 108 (1932); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Sanford Real Estate Corp., 157 Misc.
563, 284 N. Y. Supp. 73, aff'd, 246 App. Div. 567, 282 N. Y. Supp. 840 (4th Dep't 1935),
leave to appeal denied, id. 680; Clement v. Congress Hall, 72 Misc. 519, 132 N. Y. Supp.
16 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
65. Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929); Madfcs v.
Beverly Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929); Central Chandelier Co.
v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N. Y. 343, 182 N. E. 10 (1932); Shelton Holding Corp. v. 150
E. 48th St. Corp., 264 N. Y. 339, 191 N. E. 8 (1934); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Peckh-
Schwartz Realty Corp., 277 N. Y. 283, 14 N. E. (2d) 70 (1938). But cf. Webster v. Fall,
266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925) quoted by Loughran, J., dissenting in Matter of Schlnasl, 277
N. Y. 252, 269, 14 N..E. (2d) 58, 64 (1938) to the effect that: "The most that can be
said is that the point was in the cases if anyone had seen fit to raise it. Questions which
merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon,
are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents."
66. 1 McKiN=E, STAT. (1916) § 177.
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An after-acquired personal property clause does not bring future prop-
erty under the mortgage lien merely because it so states. It operates
only as against a person liable on the mortgage, extends only to the
mortgagor's (or any subsequent obligor's) equity in the personal property
in question, and may be cut off by the supervention of lien or attaching
creditors of the mortgagor-obligor.
Theoretically, a mortgage on future property creates no present lien,
on the ground that qui non habet, ille non dat. It is held to be a covenant
to give a mortgage in the future, creating an equitable lien upon the
future property when the same comes into existence. The covenant,
or equitable lien, is specifically enforceable in equity, but is subject to
the usual infirmities of equitable liens, and a few more besides. In the
absence of intervening equities, the future property, when acquired by the
mortgagor, is deemed to feed the mortgage. 7 Equities prior to the
mortgage are recognized in favor of creditors, i.e., lien or attaching
creditors,6 s a trustee in bankruptcy,11 and, under the former rule, an
assignee for benefit of creditors.70
Future personal property acquired by a grantee of the mortgagor,
who has not assumed the mortgage, does not, as will presently appear,
feed the mortgage; but such property installed by the mortgagor be-
tween the time of the execution of the mortgage and a conveyance is so
covered. 7' The assumption that an after-acquired property clause creates
but an affirmative covenant to give a mortgage in the future leads to
67. McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459 (1875); Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519,
24 N. E. 811 (1890); Diana Paper Co. v. Wheeler-Green Electric Co., 228 App. Div. 577,
240 N. Y. Supp. 103 (4th Dep't 1930); Rosenthal v. 269 W. 72nd St. Corp., 14S Mi-c.
854, 264 N. Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. CL 1933); and see Guaranty Trust Co. v. N. Y. &
Q. R.R., 253 N. Y. 190, 199, 170 N. E. 887, 890 (1930); Zartman v. First National Bank,
189 N. Y. 267, 272, 82 N. E. 127, 129 (1907). The validity of a mortgage of after-acquired
property is determined by the federal courts in accordance with state law. Thompzon v.
Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905).
68. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894); Prudence
Bonds Corp. v. 1000 Island House Co., Inc., 141 Misc. 39, 252 N. Y. Supp. 60 (Sup. Ct.
1930); New York Title and Mortgage Co. v. Menreal Co., 242 App. Div. 711, 273 N. Y.
Supp. 661 (2d Dep't 1934); and cf. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Nevman, N. Y. L. J. April
28, 1933 p. 2557, col. 1; Flatbush Savings Bank v. Warner-Quinlan Co, N. Y. L. J.
Jan. 17, 1933 (Sup. CL). Contra: Clarke-Woodward Co. v. H. L. Sanatorium, S3 Ore.
284, 169 Pac. 796 (1918). See cases in note 69, infra.
69. Zartman v. First National Bank, 189 N. Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907); Titusville
Iron Co. v. City of New York, 207 N. Y. 203, 100 N. E. S06 (1912).
70. Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 115, 8 N. E. 392 (1886). Under the preent rule.
N. Y. DEmToR & CaRDrroR LAW (1914) § 17 does not vest the assignee with the rights
of a judgment debtor who has acquired a lien by attachment or levy. Matter of Plleginfi,
248 App. Div. 526, 528, 290 N. Y. Supp. 774, 775 (2d Dep't 1936).
71. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. N. Y. & Q. C. Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 205, 170 N. E. 887
(1930).
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the conclusion that such covenant does not run with the land and bind
a grantee unless the latter has assumed the mortgage covenants. 2 A
distinction is to be observed between the type of property which comes
under 'the mortgage lien by virtue of contract and another type which
feeds the mortgage by operation of law. Property annexed to the mort-
gaged premises after the inception of the mortgage, in such manner
as to be deemed a part of the realty, becomes subject to the mortgage
lien under the doctrine of accession, 73 but "accession as a source of
title is quite distinct from the operation of a covenant for after-acquired
property." 74 Accession does not apply to personal property5 and future
personalty, therefore, comes under the mortgage lien by virtue of the
after-acquired personal property clause, or not at all.
72. Guaranty Trust Co. v. N. Y. & Q. C. Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887, 892
"(1930); Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 (1890); Newbyook Realty Co. v.
Frigidaire Sales Corporation, N. Y. L. J. Oct. 6, 1936, p. 1026, col. 6 (City Ct.); and see
authorities collected in Foley & Pogue, After-Acquired Property Under Conflicting Mortgage
Indentures (1929) 13 MINw. L. Rav. 81, 84 n. 17, and DOUGLAS & SnANxs, CAsS &
MATERIALS ON BUSINESS UNITS (1931) 27n., 51n., 53n., et. seq. A covenant to pay is not an
assumption of all the mortgage covenants. Silverstein v. Brown, 153 App. Div. 677, 138
N. Y. Supp. 848 (1st Dep't 1912).
When a mortgagor conveys to a grantee who assumes the mortgage, the mortgagee, though
a stranger to the transaction, may recover upon the assumption. Since the mortgagee was
a creditor of the mortgagor, the Tequirement of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859)
that the third party beneficiary be a creditor of the promisee is met. Where, however,
due to mesne conveyances,, the grantor is not liable on the mortgage, an assumption by a
grantee makes the mortgagee a beneficiary who may not, in New York, enforce the
assumption agreement. Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 (1877); and see cases collected
in (1921) 12 A. L. R. 1528, 1532; (1930) 39 YA= L. 3. 746; (1924) 9 Com. L. Q. 213;
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 386. Contra: Schneider v. Ferrigno, 110 Conn. 86, 147 AtI. 303
(1929).
73. Guaranty Trust Co. v. N. Y. & Q. C. Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887 (1930),
and cases collected in note 56, supra.
74. Guaranty Trust Co. v. N. Y. & Q. C. Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 206, 170 N. E. 887, 893
(1930).
75. Cf. note 74, supra. Insofar as Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Rosenthal, N. Y. L. J.
Feb. 3, 1938, p. 568 col. 1 (Sup. Ct.), holds that refrigerators were included in the lien
of a real property mortgage by accession, it cannot, in the writer's opinion, be reconciled
with prevailing authority. The cases therein relied upon deal with rolling stock on rail-
roads. In the Yailroad cases an unusually liberal rule obtains in treating rolling stock as
fixtures where an organic, rather than a physical, union is present. See Guaranty Trust
Co. N. Y. & Q. C. Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 206, 170 N. E. 887, 893 (1930); Foley & Pogue,
After-Acquired Property Under Conflicting Corporate Indentures, (1929) 13 MINN. L. Rnv.
82, 93; Blair, Allocation of After-Acquired Mortgage Property, (1927) 40 HARv. L. REy. 222,
233, n. 38. Cf. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Chicago, 253 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918). Sec
Randall v. Elwell, 52 N. Y. 521 (1873); Hoyle v. Plattsburgh & Montreal R.R. Co., 54
N. Y. 315 (1873) (rolling stock held personalty). In the Rosenthal case, supra, as well
as in Kinman v. Nyrealty Corp., 167 Misc. 534, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 948 (Sup. Ct. 1938), It
was held that the use of rents, which had been appropriated to a mortgagee's use by an
assignment of rents or the appointment of a receiver, to pay the balance due on refrig-
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Effect on Attached Articles
The personal property clause quoted above is expressly designed to
cover more than "appurtenances." There is little, if any, question but
that the after-acquired personal property clause covers, generally, such
attached articles as are subsequently installed by the mortgagor though
not of such nature as would be deemed to be a part of the realty."0 The
questions raised by attached articles come up between the mortgagee and
third persons, usually conditional vendors and chattel mortgagees, a
subject to be discussed infra. They offer relatively little difficulty be-
tween mortgagor and mortgagee. But the same is not true with respect
to unattached articles.
Effect on Unattached Articles
It has been made clear recently that the after-acquired personal prop-
erty clause is insufficient in itself to bring unattached articles under the
mortgage lien and that, in addition thereto, there must be a separate
manifestation of intent, that such articles be covered, either in the mort-
gage itself or collateral instruments, or by a general course of dealing
between the mortgagor and mortgagee. In Manufacturers Truest Com-
pany v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corporation,77 the Court of Appeals laid
down rules which will be projected into all future decisions on the sub-
ject. Before this case there was authority for the proposition that un-
attached articles, installed by the mortgagor subsequent to the inception
of the mortgage, did not come under its lien. Though coal was held
covered in one case,78 the phrase "or used in connection therewith" had
erators, constituted a good defense to the mortgagee in an action based upon an alleged
conversion of the refrigerators.
76. Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N. Y. 343, 132 N. E. 10 (1932);
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Progress Club, 237 App. Div. 812, 260 N. Y. Supp. 990
(1st Dep't 1932), aff'g, N. Y. L. J. Oct. 31, 1932 p. 1346, col. 3; New York Title &
Mortgage Co. v. lenreal Corporation, 242 App. Div. 711, 273 N. Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dep't
1934); Rosenthal v. 269 W. 72nd Street Corporation, 143 311isc. 854, 264 N. .1. Supp. 744
(Sup. Ct. 1933); Grant v. Atlantic Assets, Inc., 163 lisc. 728, 29S N. Y. Supp. 215 (City
CL 1937). See Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corporation, 277 N. Y.
233, 286, 14 N. E. (2d) 70, 71 (1933). The clause does not cover articles intended to be,
but not yet, attached. McCloskey v. Henderson, 231 N. Y. 130, 131 N. E. 365 (1921)
(heating equipment); Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., supra, (lighting fixtures).
It covers the mortgagor's interest as conditional vendee. Washington Trust Co. v. Morse
Iron Works & Dry Dock Co, 187 N. Y. 307, 79 N. E. 1022 (1907). The term "fitting?
has been held not to include furniture. Howe Rogers Co. v. Lynn, 71 F. (2d) 2S3
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
77. 277 N. Y. 233, 14 N. E. (2d) 70 (1933).
73. Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon Street Co., 145 Misc. 475, 259 N. Y. Supp.
563 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
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been held to be a nullity in Ex parte B. P. 0. Elks7 City Bank Farmers
Trwt Co. v. Progress Club, 0 and New York Title & Mortgage Co. v.
Menreal Corporation,1 cases involving furniture, furnishings, and per-
sonal property found in club houses. Their present authority must now
be reassessed.
Shelton Holding Corporation v. 150 East 48th Street Corporation"
is the first Court of Appeals opinion to consider the subject. There the
mortgagor, under a building-loan mortgage, covenanted to erect a fully
equipped apartment hotel from the proceeds of the mortgage. After
erection of the building the mortgagor entered into a lease under which
the tenant agreed to install the necessary equipment. After such installa-
tion the tenant executed a chattel mortgage, covering the equipment, to
a third person. In an action by the real property mortgagee to cancel
the chattel mortgage, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The short
after-acquired personal property clause was held to cover "kitchenettes".
Despite a ruling by the lower court that "at no time did the said chattels
... upon their installation, or in any other manner, become an integral
part of the realty", the Court of Appeals held that the clause "covers
personal property which does not by affixation become part of the
realty."83
Two separate reasons were advanced for the Shelton decision though
the distinction was not marked by the court. The mortgagor's agreement
to erect a completely equipped hotel was held to manifest an intent to
bring such equipment under the mortgage lien. In this the case for-
shadows the Peck-Schwartz decision. In addition to this, however, the
court held that the kitchenettes were necessary in effecting the purposes
for which the premises were designed.
"Without kitchenette equipment, the building would not be complete for
-9. 69 F. (2d) 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). Although the Elks case holds that the club's
unattached equipment was not covered by the personal properly clause of the mortgage,
curiously enough, some of the identical articles, i.e., tables, butchers' benches and blocks,
were held, in another case, to have sufficient organic unity with the realty to be subject
to a mechanic's lien for their installation. Sherwin v. B. P. 0. Brooklyn Lodge No. 22,
148 Misc. 452, 265 N. Y. Supp. 14 (Sup. Ct. 1930). Somewhat similar is Wable Phillips
Co. v. 59th St. Madison Ave. Co., 153 App. Div. 17, 138 N. Y. Supp. 13 (1st Dep't 1912),
aff'd, 214 N. Y. 684, 108 N. E. 1110 (1915), upholding a mechanic's lien for the installation
of electric light ceiling lamps and chandeliers, reflectors, brackets and lanterns, gas and
electric brackets--all designed specially for the premises.
80. 237 App. Div. 812, 260 N. Y. Supp. 990 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'g, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 31,
1932, p. 1846, col. 3.
81. 242 App. Div. 711, 273 N. Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dep't 1934). In the Meneal case,
supra, the ventilating system was deemed "a part of the freehold by accession", a result
which might have been reached independently of a personal property clause.
82. 264 N. Y. 339, 191 N. E. 8 (1934).
83. Id. at 347, 191 N. E. at 11.
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the use for which it was designed, and the parties intended that a complete
apartment hotel should be placed upon the leased realty, and that kitchenette
equipment should be installed by the lessee '8
In other words, the court found an organic, if Vzot a physical, unity be-
tween the equipment and the realty.
Several other decisions reached similar results without much explana-
tion. In President, etc., Manhattan Co. v. Silrap Construction Co., the
Court of Appeals, as did the Appellate Division, affirmed without opinion,
a ruling that the after-acquired personal property clause covered furni-
ture and furnishings in a furnished apartment house. An affirmance
without opinion, while approving the result, does not necessarily endorse
the reasoning of the lower court8 Furthermore, other factors were
present including the fact that representatives of the mortgagee, while
in possession, had used rents in payment of installments due on the arti-
cles in question. Besides this, a claim of unfair dealing was presented.
The Silrap case was not, therefore, a clean cut holding. President, etc.,
Manhattan Co. v. Ellda Corp.,,7 held that the short after-acquired per-
sonal property clause covers furniture, furnishings, linen, china and
glassware in addition to fixtures. These cases were followed in Matter
of Downtown Athletic Club, 8 in which another building loan mortgage
was involved. The building loan agreement there provided for the reten-
tion of the final advance until all equipment had been installed free and
clear of encumbrances. In a contest over the complete furnishings of a
large men's club, costing $300,000. the mortgagee prevailed over the trus-
tees for the mortgagor's creditors. In discussing the short after-acquired
personal property, Patterson, J., wrote:89
" . .. by such a clause furnishings not physically affixed to the building are
subjected to the mortgage on thq realty, provided that they are used in con-
nection with the building for the purpose for which the building was designed.
In other words, the clause is given an effect corresponding to the plain sense
of the words used."
The situation virtually duplicates the Shelton case. M aking the final
advance conditional upon complete installation of the equipment was a
clear indication of the security the mortgagee expected. The quoted
language, however, indicates a recognition of the organic unity of the
S4. Id.
85. 265 N. Y. 5S8, 193 N. E. 333 (1934). The facts appear in the record on app2al.
S6. Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 250 N. Y. 29, 164 N. E. 732 (1928);
Palmer v. Travis, 223 N. Y. 150, 119 N. E. 437 (1918); Marcus, Afirmance Withort
Opinion (1937) 6 Foanu= L. Rav. 212.
87. 245 App. Div. 625, 283 N. Y. Supp. 827 (1st Dep't 1935).
33. 18 F. Supp. 712 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
89. Id. at 715.
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equipment with the realty. The decision goes further than the Shelton
case, considering the type of equipment awarded to the mortgagee.
The Shelton and later cases have been- explained 0 and distinguished
on the ground that they involved building loan agreements providing for
construction from the proceeds of 'the loan. This may imply the theory
that the mortgagee paid, by making building loan advances, for the
articles to be installed and, upon such installation, became a "purchaser"
of the equipment in question. The "purchaser" theory might properly
be invoked, between the mortgagee and third persons, to resolve con-
flicting claims to priority but has no place in the construction of the
after-acquired personal property clause as between mortgagor and mort.
gagee and those claiming through them. The building loan factor should
be considered only insofar as it is an indication of an agreement covering
unattached equipment. It should not be used to limit a broad interpreta-
tion of the personal property clauses to this type of case and exclude
therefrom purchase money mortgages, mortgages executed upon equipped
buildings after construction, or equipment installed to replace, improve
or merely maintain, the premises. The building loan cases are more apt
to reach the courts than the others"' but it is unreasonable to suppose
that the lien of the Shelton mortgage would have been more limited were
the same mortgage made after completion of the building. 2 In such
event the mortgagee would, subject to possible outstanding rights in
favor of conditional vendors and chattel mortgagees, be a "purchaser"
within the filing requirements and it has been so held. 3 When the mort-
gage is made after the structure is complete-a time when the more con-
servative lending institutions are apt to come into the picture-the
theory of organic unity, advanced in the Shelton and Downtown Ath-
letic Club cases, should impel a construction that the mortgage covers a
90. Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Dalan Bldg. Corp., N. Y. L. J. June 8, 1936,
p. 2929, col. 1 (County Ct.); Same v. 415 National Boulevard, Inc., N. Y. L. J., May 14,
1936, p. 2481, col. 1 (County Ct.); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. 462 Fulton St. Corp.,
N. Y. L. J. April 6, 1936, p. 1744, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.); and cf. Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y.
377, 383 (1873); Peter Doelger, Inc. v. Doone Realty Co., 167 Misc. 619 (1938); Nlcldas
v. Pickford, 160 Misc. 254, 257, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1058 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
91. The high proportion of building loan cases does not necessarily prove that the
building loan factor is prevailing. These cases appear more frequently than others because
of the common phenomena of inadequate secondary financing, collapse of the enterprise,
and a consequent free for all by creditors.
92. Not until completion of the building would the mortgage have been a legal invest-
ment for trustees. See Matter of Dalsimer, 160 Misc. 906, 914, 291 N. Y. Supp. 34, 37,
aff'd, 251 App. Div. 385, 296 N. Y. Supp. 209 (1st Dep't 1937); Matter of Adriance, 145
Misc. 349, 260 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1932); and cf. People v. Clarke, 252 App. Div.
122, 123, 297 N. Y. Supp. 776 (Ist Dep't 1937).
93. "Compare Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929);
but ci. notes 116 and 117, infra.
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building "complete for the purpose for which it was designed." This
theory could be extended, without violence to its reasoning, to imply an
intention that the building be not only "complete" but that it be main-
taied for its designed use, and thus place additions and replacements
within the scope of the after-acquired property clause under the mort-
gage lien. It would be a slight development of the Shelton case to hold
that lobby furniture in an apartment house is covered and it would be
possible to push this tendency considerably without reaching the sweep-
ing conclusion of the Downtown Athletic Club case.
The Peck-Schwartz case brought the question again to the Court of
Appeals and involved the furniture, fixtures and equipment of a hotel.
The court did not inquire whether any of the unattached equipment
was essential to the use of the realty but sought merely, and found
lacking, an agreement of the parties, other than the short after-acquired
property clause, with respect thereto. This conclusion was based upon
three factors: (1) the mortgagor had applied for a building loan mort-
gage without referring in his application therefor to furnishings; (2)
the mortgagor's agreement to furnish the mortgagee with fire insurance
on the realty did not extend to the personalty; (3) the building loan ad-
vances were to be made regardless of the installation of equipment.
The court stated flatly that the after-acquired personal property clause
does not, per se, cover movables "which are not so attached to the realty
as to become fixtures." It held that personal property not in existence
at the inception of the mortgage is not thereby included in the absence
of an express agreement to this effect or an unequivocal demonstration
"from all the facts and circumstances that the intent was to make them
a part of the security for the loan." Although all the contested articles
were after-acquired, as is necessarily true in the building loan cases, this
express reference to future property is apt to confuse the distinction
between two unrelated questions. After-acquired property clauses are
good as between parties to the mortgage although the mortgagee's rights
thereunder may be cut off by creditors of the mortgagor. Therefore,
there is no distinction, as between the parties, between the personal
property and after-acquired personal property clauses. Here, the appel-
lant derived his title to the realty through a junior real property mortgage
and claimed the equipment through a chattel mortgage and the decision,
therefore, is tantamount to a construction of the personal property clause
as between the original parties to the mortgage.
Before further discussion of the Peck-Schwartz, Shelton, and Down-
town Athletic Club cases, reference should be made to Matter of 671
Prospect Avenue Holding Corporation,4 decided by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit, so shortly after the Peck-Sclrartz case as
94. 97 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
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to indicate the possibility that the benefit of the latter case was un-
available to the Circuit Court. The court here affirmed a judgment
against the trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor, holding that the
mortgage covered all the equipment of a catering establishment including
forks, spoons, knives and kitchenware. The background of this case in-
volved a contract of sale of the premises, made with an individual who
subsequently assigned his rights as vendee to a corporation. The con-
tract provided that the purchaser would give a purchase money real
property mortgage and, in addition, a chattel mortgage covering consider-
able equipment including unattached articles. The real property cover-
age was less broad. On appeal, the mortgagee's attorney sought to
overcome the narrow language of the real property mortgage with the
argument that the contract of sale contemplating a purchase money
mortgage on the realty from an individual, could not, under sections 230
and 231 of the Lien Law, validly cover chattels. A chattel mortgage was
in fact given but, due to the mortgagee's failure to file, was disregarded
by the court as well as by the parties.
Matter of 671 Prospect Avenue Holding Corporation involved a mort-
gage expressly purporting to cover "fixtures and articles of personal
property used in the operation of said premises", and contained a long
clause specifically enumerating many articles all of which, with one
exception, fall into two classes: (1) articles which under common law
rules are fixtures between mortgagor and mortgagee; (2) attached arti-
cles which under the decided cases have been held to be covered by the
personal property clause. The only unattached article specifically re-
ferred to was furniture. The court stated that "'used in connection with,
the premises' includes such unattached personalty as is necessary in ef-
fecting the purposes for which the premises were designed" but its appli-
cation of this principle to tableware, etc., cannot be reconciled with the
controlling state decisions.
Insofar as the Downtown Athletic Club and the Peck-Schwartz cases
look for the intention of the parties beyond the after-acquired personal
property clause, their approaches differ. Patterson, J. ruled that un-
attached equipment, organically connected with the realty, is presumably
covered by the after-acquired personal property clause but that this
presumption may be overridden where the mortgage papers and the
conduct of the parties, taken as a whole, indicate no coverage was in-
tended. The Peck-Schwartz case, without distinguishing between the
different types of unattached personal property, presumes that they are
not covered in the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary.
More litigation will be necessary before the questions suggested by the
Peck-Schwartz decision can be resolved. The Downtown Athletic Club
and Matter of 671 Prospect Avenue Holding Corporation cases distin-
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guished the Elks case on the ground that the final advance in the latter
case was to be made regardless of the installation of the equipment. The
671 Prospect Avenue case involved a purchase money, not a building
loan, mortgage, and this factor was, therefore, not directly relevant. The
same point was made in the Peck-Schwartz case. It may well be that
the failure to connect the final advance with the equipment represented
a compromise, without being conclusive as to the ultimate intention of
the parties, between the exigencies of a not over-affluent builder and
moderately conservative financing. Trust companies and trustees do not
finance building construction and those that do, enjoying a relatively
high interest rate, may feel safe enough in releasing the final advance
immediately upon completion of the lienable work. Judge Patterson also
distinguished the Elks case on the ground that the prospectus, under
which participating interests in the mortgage were sold to the public,
described only the land and building as security; and in the Peck-
Schwartz case reference was made to the mortgagor's failure to mention
furnishings in the mortgage application. In view of the existing case
law too much stress should not be placed upon a reluctance to accom-
pany a public offering of mortgage bonds with a broader statement. A
mortgagor's agreement to cover equipment with fire insurance for the
mortgagees benefit is cogent evidence of an aim to bring such equip-
ment under the mortgage but a failure so to provide does not establish
the contrary. A mortgagee's fire insurance can safely be, and usually
is, less than the amount of the mortgage. It rarely exceeds the value
of the building exclusive of foundations. All of these arguments are ad-
mittedly speculative and are offered only to suggest that these factors
should not be deemed conclusive.
The Peck-Schwartz rule, requiring collateral instruments to be exam-
ined, is in accord with the rule that related contracts should be read
together."a But where a mortgage contains a personal property clause
and the papers as a whole contain other provisions respecting personal
property for the mortgagee's protection, shall the various provisions be
deemed dependent? An agreement to give a chattel mortgage could
be regarded as an intention not to rely on the real property mortgage for
this purpose. In both Downtown Athletic Club and 671 Prospect Ave-
nue it was regarded merely as a covenant for further assurances. In
671 Prospect Avenue a chattel mortgage was given which was admittedly
invalid. If this chattel mortgage had not been given, would the mortgagee
have had an equitable lien, based on the covenant to give a mortgage,
95. Ewing v. Wightman, 167 N. Y. 107, 60 N. E. 322 (1901); manufacturer's Trtst
Co. v. Steinbardt, 265 N. Y. 145, 191 N. E. 867 (1934); and see cases In Editorial N. Y.
L. J. Dec. 28, 1936, n. S.
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better than the worthless chattel mortgage actually given and subject
only to rights of the mortgagor's creditors?
The law was in confusion prior to the Peck-Schwartz case, as is indi-
cated by the cases cited in footnote 90, and particularly by Title Guaran-
tee & Trust Co. v. 415 National Boulevard Inc." wherein a foreclosure
receiver applied for leave to compromise the owner of the equity's claim
of conversion, based upon the receiver's use of beds, chairs, lamps, rugs,
etc. The court refused to pass upon the merits of the claim and denied
the application upon the condition that the mortgagee agree to hold the
receiver harmless. Since the Peck-Schwartz case the tendency has been
to refer the cases to trial." These cases must necessarily look ex post
facto into old closings for the type of evidence now required by the Court
of Appeals. The newer closings will give a heavy advantage to special-
ists over general practitioners.
The Peck-Schwartz decision has encouraged mortgagee's attorneys to
revise the personal property clauses, usually by expansion. To the words
"articles of personal property used in connection with the premises", they
have tacked on "all of which are deemed to be fixtures and a part of
the realty." Calling a vestibule chair "realty" is, it is submitted, a legal
solecism. Another phrase added to the after-acquired personal property
clause is "all of which shall be deemed to be a portion of the security
for the indebtedness." This phrase does not ring true when applied to
property not in existence and installed at the mortgagor's option for re-
placements or mere maintenance. Another practice is to add to the short
clause an encyclopedic schedule of equipment which is printed as the
mortgagee's standard form of mortgage and used indiscriminately. This
may show the mortgagee's habitual intent but is apt to fit a particular
situation like a hired tuxedo. Furthermore, it tends to break down the
policy behind the short-form mortgage connected with expanded explan-
ations incorporated in the Real Property Law.
Many of the problems suggested by the Peck-Schwartz case would be
avoided if the short after-acquired personal property clause "were given
an effect corresponding to the plain sense of the words used. It would
include the articles, irrespective of annexation, that the owner of the
particular type of building involved ordinarily installs and offers for the
use of prospective tenants, to make the building usable for the purposes
96. N. Y. L. J. May 14, 1936, p. 2481, col. 6. But in Peter Doelger, Inc. v. Doone
Realty Co., Inc., 167 Misc. 619, (Sup. Ct. 1938), an owner's claim, on settlement of a
receiver's accounting, for the value of gas ranges and refrigerators not sold in the fore-
closure action, or for the value of their use, was disallowed.
97. Clinton Trust Co. v. The Church Extens. Comm., 255 App. Div. 155, 5 N. Y. S.
(2d) 290 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1938); and see dissent in East River Savings Bank v. 671
Prospect Ave. Holding Corp., 254 App. Div. 845 (1st Dep't 1938). But cf. Title Guarantee
& Trust Co. v. Spur Amusement Corp., 254 App. Div. 907 (2d Dep't 1938).
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for which it was designed, and exclude the articles which such tenants
ordinarily install for their own purposes, despite the fact that the latter
types of articles may, in fact, be occasionally supplied by an owner. A
contrary rule unsatisfactorily requires an ascertainment of the intention
of the original parties to the mortgage from data probably to be found
outside of the four corners of the mortgageY. There should be no
necessity for this because construction of a contract by acts of the parties
is recognized only where the contract is ambiguous, but never to con-
tradict its plain purport." No public policy is involved,'l c in construing
the personal property clause according to its plain sense, as has been
held to be in the cases concerning a mortgagor's executory agreement
to waive his right of redemption.1"' The test applied to unattached
articles would be that of organic unity. The result should go far toward
satisfying the necessities that produced the development of personal
property clauses, i.e., that mortgage liens should cover more than common
law fixtures, and clarify the rules at least with respect to the ordinary
mortgage. Its application to a men's club or any unusual situation will
offer difficulties and it is to these that the rule of the Peck-Schwartz
case should be applied, and limited.
Conditional Vendbrs' Rights-Pcrsonal Property Law,
Sections 65 and 67
The rights of conditional vendors are affected by the necessity of filing
under one of two statutes. Personal Property Law, Section 65, applying
to chattels generally, makes the reservation of title void as against a
creditor or lienor who purchases the goods or acquires a lien without
notice before the conditional sale is filed. Personal Property Law, Sec-
tion 67, applies to chattels intended to be affixed to realty and contains,
in substance, the three following provisions:
(1) If the chattels are not severable1O 2 without material injury, the reserva-
98. This factor does not make four ready assignability of mortgages-a matter of
importance to owners in the refinancing of mortgages which do not generally run for
more than five years.
99. Buder v. New York Trust Co., 82 F. (2d) 168 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Elefante v.
Pizitz, 182 App. Div. 819, 169 N. Y. Supp. 910 (Ist Dep't 1918), affd, 230 N. Y. S67,
130 N. E. 896 (1920).
100. "Stipulations between a landlord and tenant ...are not matters of public con-
cern." Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N. Y. 4S9, 498, 180 N. E.
245, 247 (1932). And leasehold provisions excusing a lesor from liability for his own
negligence were upheld (id.) until N. Y. R 11L Pnop. Lme (1937) § 234 expresiy made
them invalid in leases thereafter executed.
101. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Liberdar Holding Co., 74 F. (2d) 50, 53 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934);
and see dissent in Verity v. Metropolis Land Co., 248 App. Div. 748, 28S N. Y. Supp.
625 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 274 N. Y. 624, 10 N. E. (2d) 582 (1937).
102. For constructions, of "severability" see (1935) 48 HtMV. L. REV. 857; (1927)
36 Y.x L. J. 713.
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tion of title is void, after affixation, as against an owner of the realty not
assenting to the reservation;
(2) If the goods are so affixed to the realty "as to become part thereof" but
severable without material injury, the reservation of title is void as against
subsequent purchasers for value of the realty without notice of the reservation,
unless the conditional sale is filed;
(3) As against the owner of realty, who is not the buyer of goods, the
reservation of title is void where the chattels are removable unless the condi-
tional sale is filed before the goods are affixed 03
In general these sections make the difficulty of removal the criterion of
'the rights of the conditional vendor who has failed to comply with the
filing laws,"0 4 whereas the test of fixtures, as to the mortgagee, is, as has
been already noted, largely one of intent. 10 5
The second part of this section:
"changed the law as to the legal status of certain classes of chattels so affixed
to real property as to become a part thereof, but severable therefrom without
material injury to the freehold, and overrode the intention of the parties,
theretofore controlling at common law, that such goods should remain personal
property because the parties had so agreed."106
This change affects only articles which are subject to conditional sales.
The reservation of title by the conditional sale contract was no longer
to impress the continuing character of personal property upon articles
annexed to a building by a purchaser in such a manner as would other-
wise be deemed to become part of the realty.10 7 A double purpose was
intended-protection for both the vendor of the goods and for a pur-
chaser of the realty.0 8 The statute provides for filing in the office where
land titles are recorded and where the intending purchaser of realty can
learn whether he may confidently buy the fixture as part of the realty.
The statute, as construed, however, does not offer complete assurance
to the uninitiate for the reason that the courts recognize a distinct class
of goods, which though "affixed to the realty" are held to have a fixed
status as personalty. This class is made up of the second group referred
103. The words "who is not the buyer of the goods" were added by N. Y. LAws of
1930 c. 874. Prior thereto it was read into the statute by implication. M. P. Moller,
Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
104. Matter of Phillips & Ibsen, Inc. (unreported) (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
105. Cf. text at p. 333, supra.
106. See In re Albanese, 44 F. (2d) 602, 603 (N. D. N. Y. 1930).
107. See Madfes v. Beverly Construction Co., 251 N. Y. 12, 16, 166 N. E. 783, 785 (1929).
108. See Kobler Company v. Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 227, 164 N. E. 31, 32 (1928).
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to supra,0 9 of which gas ranges and refrigerators 10 are the most common
examples. They are deemed not to become a part of the realty. They
are subject to the filing and other requirements of Personal Property
Law, Section 65, rather than Section 67. For this reason, a search of
the land records will give no notice of the reservation of title.
Without regard to this special class, if the chattels are severable with-
out material injury to the realty and the conditional sale is filed, the
rights of the vendor are superior to those of the mortgagee, whether the
chattels are installed before or after the making of the mortgage.2'
The same rule applies to purchase-money chattel mortgages." 2  If the
real property mortgage is first recorded, however, the after-acquired
property clause attaches to the chattels as a first lien unless the chattel
mortgage is a purchase-money mortgage." 3 The priority of the condi-
109. Cf. text at p. 332, supra.
110. Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929);
Kelvinator Sales Corp. v. Byro Realty Corp., 136 Misc. 720, 241 N. Y. Supp. 632, ao'd,
233 App. Div. 653 (Ist Dep't 1931); Whitney & Co. v. Brown, 253 App. Div. 10 (3rd
Dep't 1938); Orbon Stove Company v. Schroeder, 241 App. Div. 832 (2d Dep'L 1934).
111. Harvard Financial Corp. v. Greenblatt Construction Co., 261 N. Y. 169, 134 N. E.
748 (elevator); Lightolier Company v. Del Mar Club Holding Co., 237 App. Div. 432,
262 N. Y. Supp. 32 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd, 263 N. Y. 5S8, 189 N. E. 711 (1933) (electrical
fixtures); Washington Mortgage Corp. v. Forways Realty Corp., 235 App. Div. 642, 255
N. Y. Supp. 110 (2d Dep't 1932) (pipe organ); Prisco & Soverio Inc. v. Bifulco Bros.,
Inc., 234 App. Div. 122, 254 N. Y. Supp. 459 (2d Dep't 1931) (kitchen cabinets); Hobart
Holding Co. v. Fortwell Realty Co., 232 App. Div. 689, 264 N. Y. Supp. 744 (2d Dep't
1931) (refrigerators); Perfect Lighting Fixtures Inc. v. Grubar Realty Corp., 228 App.
Div. 141, 239 N. Y. Supp. 286 (lt Dep't 1930) (electrical fixtures); Rosenthal v. 269 W.
72nd St. Corp., 148 Misc. 854, 855, 264 N. Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (refrigerators,
dictum); Prudence Bonds Corp. v. 1000 Thousand Island House Co., 141 Misc. 39, 252
N. Y. Supp. 60 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (sprinkler system; vendor entitled to Yemove vithout
restoration of building but responsible for any negligent injury to freehold). See also
cases cited in Notes (1921) 13 A. L. R. 448, 460; (1931) 73 L. R. A. 748, 755; (1934)
83 L. R. A. 1318, 1324. In Washington Trust Co. v. Morse L W. & D. D. Co., 187 N. Y.
307, 79 N. E. 1022 (1907), the rights of a conditional vendor of a pumping plant were
held superior to a prior mortgagee but the question of recordation did not arise.
112. Cf. Metropolitan Concert Company v. Sperry, 9 N. Y. S. Rep. 342, afl'd, 120
N. Y. 620, 23 N. E. 1152 (1890).
113. Matter of Downtown Athletic Club, 18 F. Supp. 712, (S. D. N. Y. 1936); Shelton
Holding Corporatfon v. 150 E. 48th St. Corp., 264 N. Y. 339, 191 N. E. 8 (1934); Herold
v. Cohrone Boat Co., 249 App. Div. 318; 292 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dep't 1936); Rosenthal
v. 269 W. 72nd St. Corp., 148 Misc. 854, 264 N. Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1933). The
real property mortgagee, likewise, prevails over a subsequent aszignee of the mortgagor.
Grant v. Atlantic Assets, Inc., 163 Misc. 728, 298 N. Y. Supp. 215 (City Ct. 1937).
The reason for distinguishing between an ordinary chattel mortgage and a psrchase money
chattel mortgage is based upon the nature of a purchase money mortgage. Theoretically,
the interest of a purchase money mortgagee is a continuation of hi3 interest as vendor.
The vendee, and persons claiming through the vendee, take only subject to such interest.
Dusenbury v. Hulbert, 59 N. Y. 541 (1875); Boies v. Benham, 127 N. Y. 620, 23 N. E.
657 (1891) ; Shilowitz v. Wadler, 237 App. Div. 330, 261 N. Y. Supp. 351 (3d Dep't 1932) ;
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tional vendor or chattel mortgagee, affected by compliance with the filing
statutes, may be nullified by the "three-corner priority puzzle.""1 4
If the conditional sale is not filed, it is, nevertheless, good as between
the parties thereto,115 and unless Personal Property Law, Section 65 or
67 applies, the reservation of title is good as against third persons.1
Duer v. Kent Realty Co., 113 Misc. 743, 186 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Sup. Ct. 1920). Therefore,
when a real property mortgagor buys personal property and gives a chattel mortgage in
part payment therefor, the chattel mortgagee claims under a right created prior to the
time when the lien of the real property mortgagee's after-acquired property clause could
attach.
114. In Chasnov v. Marlane Holding Co., 137 Misc. 332, 244 N. Y. Supp. 455 (Sup.
Ct. 1930), and G. Goldberg & Sons v. Gilet Building Corp., 135 Misc. 158, 237 N. Y. Supp.
258 (Sup. Ct. 1929), the mortgaged premises were subject to building loan and subordinate
mortgages, both containing after-acquired personal property clauses. Subsequent to the
recordation of the mortgages, conditional vendors sold and installed refrigerators and other
chattels. After installation the building loan mortgagees made additional advances in
accordance with the terms of their building loan agreements. Thereafter, the conditional
sales were filed. The junior mortgagees foreclosed and, subsequently, were sued by the
vendors for conversion. The building loan mortgagees were deemed purchasers by virtue
of advances made subsequent to installation without knowledge of the retention of title.
The junior mortgagees, though not deemed purchasers, and therefore subordinate to the
conditional vendors, were held to have good defenses to claims for conversion on the ground
that they could not commit waste against the prior building loan mortgagees either by
removing the chattels themselves or permitting third persons to accomplish the same.
Somewhat similar situations were before the court in McCloskey v. Henderson, 231 N. Y.
130, 131 N. E. 865 (1921), and Shelton Holding CoYp. v. 150 E. 48th St. Corp., 264 N. Y.
339, 191 N.,E. 8 (1934).
115. The common law rule that an unfiled conditional sale was good as between the
parties [Creamery Package Manufacturing Co. v. Horton, 178 App. Div. 467, 165 N. Y.
Supp. 257 (3d Dep't 1917); Kommel v. Herb-Gner Construction Co., 228 App. Div. 96,
239 N. Y. Supp. 148 (1st Dep't 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 256 N. Y. 333, 176 N. E.
413 (1931)] is unchanged by N. Y. Pins. PROP. LAw (1931) § 67. M. P. Moller Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 1001, 1003 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); (1928) 37 YALn L. J. 505, n. 79.
116. A prior mortgagee is not a "purchaser" of subsequently installed goods. Icahn
v. Kestlinger, 231 App. Div. 841, 246 N. Y. Supp. 829 (2d Dep't 1930); In re Tonawanda
Brewing Corp., 13 F. Supp. 345 (W. D. N. Y. 1936) (brewing vats and tanks). Neither
is a purchaser at a foreclosure sale of a prior mortgage. Craine Silo Co., Inc. v. Alden
State Bank, 218 App. Div. 263, 218 N. Y. Supp. 143 (4th Dep't 1926) (silo). In India
Wharf Holding Corp. v. 60 Hamilton Avenue Corp., N. Y. L. J. Oct. 11, 1934 p. 1219,
col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) a sprinkler system which, by stipulation at the trial was agreed to be
removable, had been installed under an unfiled conditional sales contract. A junior
mortgagee, after such installation, had advanced money in payment of interest on the
senior mortgage. Such advances were held to be in protection of the junior mortgage,
giving the holder a right of subrogation but not making him a "purchaser" of the
sprinkler system, despite the presence of an after-acquired personal property clause in the
junior mortgage.
A trustee in bankruptcy of a conditional vendee is not a "purchaser" and derives no
advantage from a failure to file. M. P. Moller Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 1001,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932) (pipe organ); In.re Albanese, 44 F. (2d) 602 (N. D. N. Y. 1930)
(theatre seats attached to concrete floor by expanding screws).
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Where the mortgagee is a "purchaser", the reservation of title is invalid
as to him; 'I but this problem is less apt to arise in the case of chattel
Where building loan mortgages covered future goods "attached to or used in connection
with" the premises, advances made thereunder after delivery of goods intended to be,
but not at the time of the advances, affixed to the premises, the mortgagee was held not
to be a "purchaser" of the unaffixed articles. Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
259 N. Y. 343, 182 N. E. 10 (1932) (lighting fixtures); MeCloskey v. Henderson, 231
N. Y. 130, 131 N. E. 865 (1921) (materials for beating plant). In both thcze cascs the
mortgagee was held to be a purchaser of similar articles installed at the time of the
advance. These cases do not exclude unattached goods from the scope of the usual personal
property clause but expressly hold that goods intended to be affied are not covered by
the mortgage until after fixation.
Where the articles are gas ranges and refrigerators, and subject only to N. Y. P=3s.
PRoP. L.,w (1938) § 65, a subsequent mortgagee [Madfes v. Beverly Development
Co., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929); Central Union Gas Company v. Brovning, 210
N. Y. 10, 103 N. E. 822 (1913)], or vendee of the realty [Kelvinator Sales Corporation
v. Byro Realty Co., 136 msc. 720, 241 N. Y. Supp. 632, aff'd, 233 App. Div. 653, 249
N. Y. Supp. 910 (1st Dep't 1931)], is not a "purchaser" by virtue of the mortgage or
deed. The mortgages in these cases did not expressly purport to cover personalty and
the deed included only "appurtenances." But cf. Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Bergen
Heights Realty Corp., 137 App. Div. 45, 122 N. Y. Supp. 33 (2d Dep't 1910). Reservation
of title to a refrigerating plant twining through a building, sold to a tenant, is void as
to the non-assenting owner, and a purchaser at a foreclosure sale of a prior mortgage
acquires title to the plant. Voss v. Melrose Bond & Mortgage Corp., 1CO AMic. 30, 2S
N. Y. Supp. 576 (Mun. Ct. 1936). The same was held true of plumbing installed under
a conditional sale on behalf of a tenant. LeVine v. Rosenthal, 252 App. Div. S03, 293
N. Y. Supp. 887 (3d Dep't 1937). But a mortgagee is not "the owner of the realty"
within the last sentence of N. Y. Pans. PROP. LAw (1931) § 67. Harvard Financial Corp.
v. Greenblatt Construction Co., 261 N. Y. 169, 184 N. E. 748 (1933).
117. In Kohler Co. v. Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. 31 (1928), a vendee in pos-
session of realty had a lighting and power plant installed under an unfiled conditional sale.
The plant was deemed "a part of the realty" but removable. The purchaser at a fore-
closure sale of the land contract prevailed over the conditional vendor. Either the second
or third sentence of N. Y. Pars. PRoP. LAw (1931) § 67, is applicable.
The conditional vendor who fails to file is cut off by a subsequent mortgage covering
personal property [Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929)
(gas ranges); Kommel v. Herb-Gner Construction Co., 256 N. Y. 333, 176 N. E. 413
(1931) (electric lighting fixtures); In re Tonawanda Brewing Corp., 13 F. Supp. 345
(W. D. N. Y. 1936) (brewing vats and tanks)]; or by advances, made subsequent to
installation, under a building loan mortgage containing a personal property clause [Central
Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N. Y. 343, 182 N. E. 10 (1932) (lighting fixtures);
McCloskey v. Henderson, 231 N. Y. 130, 131 N. E. 865 (1921) (heating plant); Lloyds
First Mortgage Corporation v. Lombardo, 227 App. Div. 400, 237 N. Y. Supp. 456 (2d
Dep't 1929) (gas ranges). Contra: New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Mapark Holding
Corporation, 236 App. Div. 219, 258 N. Y. Supp. 378 (lst Dep't 1932)]; or by payments
made by a property owner to a conditional vendee-builder who is obligated under his
contract to install personal property [AIf Holding Corporation v. American Stove Company,
253 N. Y. 450, 171 N. E. 703 (1930); and see Curry v. Geier Construction Co., Inc., 225
App. Div. 498, 234 N. Y. Supp. 59 (2d Dep't 1929)]. But the burden of establishin
one's self as a mortgagee in good faith, or a purchaser for value without notice, is upon
the person seeking to take advantage of the failure to file. Murphy v. Luverne Realty
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mortgages for the reason that unless a chattel mortgage in New York
is promptly filed, or accompanied by delivery of possession, it is "abso-
lutely void" against general creditors of the mortgagor whose claims
arose prior to filing."' A conditional vendor of articles attached to the
realty acquires no lien, per se, against the realty"' although the installa-
tion may be such as to be the basis of a mechanics' lien 10 against the
"owner') of the realty as that term is defined in the Lien Law. 2'
Where the articles involved are acquired, subsequent to the mortgage,
in replacement of others which had been installed when the mortgage
was made, the lower courts are in conflict. 22 The rights of a conditional
vendor of a heating plant, who had filed, were postponed to a mort-
gagee, 123 on the ground that the removal of the old plant impaired the
mortgagee's security. It was said that the vendor must prove that the
old equipment was of no value or that the new plant remained personalty.
This was distinguished subsequently, in one refrigerator case,'2 4 on the
ground that the rule was inapplicable to personalty, but was followed in
Corp., 235 App. Div. 874, 257 N. Y. Supp. 694 (2d Dep't 1932); Craine Silo Company
v. Alden State Bank, 218 App. Div. 263, 218 N. Y. Supp. 143 (4th Dep't 1926) and see
cases collected in New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Grossman Properties, Inc., 142 MIsc.
274, 276, 253 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1931), af'd, 236 App. Div. 665, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1031 (1st
Dep't 1932). A prior mortgagee is not a bona fide purchaser for value by reason of sub-
sequent extension agreement. Greater New York Development Company v. Ka-Ro
Building Corpration, 256 N. Y. 657, 177 N. E. 181 (1931).
118. N. Y. LmN LAW (1937) § 230, as construed. Baker v. Hull, 250 N. Y. 484, 489,
166 N. E. 175, 178 (1929); In re Meyers, 24 F. (2d) 349 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Matter
of Pellegrim, 248 App. Div. 526, 528, 290 N. Y. Supp. 774 (2d Dep't 1936); Matter of
Shay, 157 Misc. 615, 285 N. Y. Supp. 379 (Surr. Ct. 1935). An unfiled chattel mortgage
is good, however, between the palrties. Gandy v. Collins, 214 N. Y. 293, 108 N. E. 415
(1915) and as against the personal representatives of the mortgagor unless the estate is
insolvent, whereupon the representatives represent creditors. See Note (1934) 91 A. L. R.
299.
119. In re Master Knitting Corp., 7 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); N. Y. El. Co.
v. Petmaland Realty Corp., 243 N. Y. 477, 154 N. E. 530 (1926).
120. See (1927) YALE L. J. 713. But the filing of a mechanics lien by a conditional
vendor constitutes such an election as to bar the light to repossess under the conditional
sale. E & P. Finance Corp. v. Friedman, 264 N. Y. 285, 190 N. E. 641 (1934); Kirk
v. Crystal, 118 App. Div. 32, 103 N. Y. Supp. 17, aff'd, 193 N. Y. 622, 86 N. E. 1126 (1908).
121. N. Y. Lmu LAW (1916) § 2.
122. Cf. note 46, supra (first paragraph).
123. Roche v. Thurber, 246 App. Div. 850, 285 N. Y. Supp. 82 (1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y.
582, 4 N. E. (2d) 814 (1936).
124. Newbrook Realty Co., Inc. v. Frigidaire Sales CoYporation, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 6,
1936, p. 1026, col. 6 (City Ct.). Cf. Davis v. Bliss, 187 N. Y. 77, 83, 79 N. . 851, 854
(1907).
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three other cases.' The same conffict occurs in cases outside of New
York.'26
Cohclmsions
The mortgagee's attorney cannot advise his client with complete assur-
ance that the ordinary real estate mortgage covers unattached personalty.
He has no warrant for advising that such articles as gas ranges and
mechanical refrigerators127 are fixtures, and much less for unattached
objects. Practically, he will conclude that in many of the situations
presented the after-acquired personal property clause is of little assist-
ance. True enough, its presence will make the mortgagee a "purchaser"
even of gas ranges and refrigerators, installed at the inception of the
mortgage, and thereby cut off secret equities. But the articles in issue
have frequently been installed since the inception of the mortgage and
represent replacements, due to wear and tear, or, in a progressive com-
munity, the modernization of older structures. These may, in an urban
apartment hotel, for example, represent a huge sum. The question is,
in probably a majority of the cases, presented when the mortgage is in
default, and it is at this stage that judgments and other liens against
the mortgagor are apt to appear. Besides this, the likelihood of mesne
conveyances or the use of a dummy obligor on the mortgage, individual
or corporate, and followed by a conveyance to the real party in interest,
makes it unlikely that the owner of the equity is the mortgagor or a
person affirmatively bound by the after-acquired property clause. Herein
lies the weakness of the clause.
The theory that an after-acquired property clause is an affirmative
covenant, not running with the land, represents an exaltation of doctrine
which has no application to this situation. It is based upon a fiction that
a mortgagor agrees, as soon as the property is in esse, to give a mortgage
thereon. In fact, he almost never does give such mortgage except, pos-
sibly, in response to a covenant for further assurances. Future property,
acquired by the mortgagor and within the scope of the covenant, is held
to feed the mortgage eo instanti, without a new mortgage and withou5
any affirmative act on the mortgagor's part.2 The fiction, therefore, is
125. Nicklas v. Pickford, 160 Misc. 257, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1058 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kinman
v. Nyrealty Co., 167 Misc. 534, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 948 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Keston Holding
Corp. v. Review Palance Corp., N. Y. L. J. Jan. 8, 1933, p. 114, col. 7 (Sup. CL).
126. (1921) 13 A. L. R. 468; (1931) 73 A. L. R. 762.
127. But a central frigidaire system is. deemed part of the realty. Frigidaire Sales
Corporation v. Syracuse Investing Corp., 239 App. Div. 8S0, 265 N. Y. Supp. 566 (Ist
Dep't 1933).
128. See McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459, 466 (1875); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
N. Y. & Q. C. Ry. Co., 253 N. Y. 190, 209, 170 N. E. 887, 894 (1930); President, etc.,
Manhattan Company v. Ellda Corporation, 245 App. Div. 625, 628-629, 283 N. Y. Supp.
827, 829 (1-t Dep't 1935).
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one not intended to be relied upon, and there would seem to be slight
warrant for characterizifig this procedure as the discharge of an affirma-
tive obligation. The purchaser of the realty is charged with knowledge
of a recorded mortgage and its terms. 2 ' Despite the general rule in
New York against the running of affirmative covenants, covenants to
build fences along boundary lines, to repair party walls, to provide rail-
road crossings, to pay rent, and to repair leased buildings have been
held to run. 3' Furthermore, the Court of Appeals recently re-examined
the "ancient rules and precedents" governing the running of covenants,
determined these to be criteria voluntarily applied by the courts, and
found them no bar to the running of a covenant to pay an annual sum
for the maintenance of roads, parks, sewers and beach of a real estate
development.' Making the future property clause bind articles a sub-
129. Cambridge Valley Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. 326, 336 (1872); Anderson v. Blood,
152 N. Y. 285, 46 N. E. 493 (1897); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Queens Guaranty Trust
Co., 226 N. Y. 225, 123 N. E. 370 (1919).
130. See Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 134, 103 N. E. 1114, 1118 (1913).
131. Neponsit Property Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Bank, 278 N. Y.
248, 15 N. E. (2d) 793 (1938).
The ancient rules and precedents, dating from Spencer's Case (5 Coke 16) prescribed
that the parties must intend the covenant to run, that it must "touch" oy "concern" the
land and that there be "privity of estate" between the person seeking to enforce the
covenant and the person whose compliance is sought. The rule also required the use of
the word "assigns" where the subject mattet of the covenant was not in esse when the
covenant was made. The terms "touch" and "concern" have defied precise definition
[CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNING wITH LAND (1929) 76; (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
821, 8231, and "are not part of a statutory definition" [Neponsit, supra, at 255, 15 N. E.
(2d) at 795). The word "assigns" should be unnecessary in our question because N. Y.
REAL PROP. LAw (1909) § 257 )rads into the statutory form of mortgage a clause stating
that assigns of the mortgagor are bound with the same effect as if such assigns were named.
The policy against the running of affirmative covenants is said to be for the purpose
of lessening burdensome encumbrances on titles. See CLAIx, supra, at 113; (1936) 13
N. Y. U. L. QUART. REV. 313, 314. But many burdensome covenants aye enforced. A
right of way, for example, may perpetually burden one man's land with an easement In
favor of another, so that the former can never build upon the spot or do any act which
may interfere with the right of way. Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475, 477, 97 Am.
Dec. 633 (1869). Mortgage covenants, it should he noted, are not perpetuities. Further-
more, it has been maintained that the running of affirmative covenants and 'equitable
servitudes will enhance land's alienability. See (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 821, 826.,
Under the English rule affirmative covenants generally do not run. It has been said
that, outside of New York, the overwhelming weight of American authority is to the
contrary [Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F. (2d) 908, 911 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); 3 Pomaoy, EQ.
JuaRs. (4th ed. 1918) § 1295; (1934) 19 CoRN. L. Q. 145, 1461 and that affirmative and
negative covenants un with equal facility [(1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. QUART. REV. 313, 3141.
But an examination of the American decisions in the last decade indicates that affirmative
covenants in exactly one half of the cases were made to run, and concludes that the
American rule is confused and chaotic. (1933) 47 YALE L. J. 821. In Miller v. Clary,
210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1913) the court not only pointed out that some affirmative
covenants run in New York, i.e., to build fences along boundaty lines, repair party walls,
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sequent owner acquires, would, it is submitted, be no more "affirmative"
than his liability in rem to pay interest and taxes. Inasmuch as the
after-acquired property clause concededly creates an equitable mortgage
upon the goods as soon as they come into being, the rule that lien and
attaching creditors prevail over the mortgagee with respect to after-
acquired property is an illogical limitation upon the general rule that
equitable mortgages are enforceable against the mortgagor, attaching or
levying creditors and all subsequent takers with notice.1 32 This excep-
tion has not escaped criticism.?a The situation is not comparable to
that of the all-inclusive corporate °trust indenture,134 the construction of
which has been held to "justify a limited displacement of contract and
recorded liens on behalf of temporary and unsecured creditors.' 35
There is no reason why replacements and additions, made to preserve
both the equity and mortgage security from waste, and obsolescence
should not enure to the benefit of the mortgage lien. Neither is there
any reason, other than the traditional notion of fixtures, to prevent all
articles installed in mortgaged property, by the mortgagor or any owner
provide railroad crossings, pay rent and repair leased buildings, but exprealy left the way
open for further exceptions. Prior to the Neponsit case, the American case3 were criticized
generally for being based upon an uncritical acceptance and an inconsistent use of ancient
theories and metaphysical doctrine. It was suggested that the intention of the parties be
emphasized as a guiding test together with a use of judicial discretion to decide that
covenants should run. (1938) 47 YA.X L. J. 821. This approach was used by the court
in the Neponsit case, supra, which referred to the ancient rules as "words used by courts
in England in old cases to describe a limitation which the courts themselves created or
to formulate a test which the courts have devised and which the courts voluntarily apply."
278 N. Y. at 255, 15 N. E. (2d) at 795. Though the court paid lip service to the require-
ments of Spencer's Case, supra, it read a new content into them. In construing the
requirement of "touching" and "concerning" the court distinguished covenants that run
from personal covenants by "a classification based upon substance *rather than form"
and by looking to "the effect of the covenant on the legal rights which otherwrie would
flow from the ownership of the land and which are connected with the land." The cor-
porate plaintiff owned no land in the development and the defendant argued that there was
no privity of estate. Nevertheless, the court found that the plaintiff was acting as agent
or representative of the property owners and, without ignoring the corporate form, con-
cluded that "the ancient formula . . . should not be applied to this case. In substance if
not in form the covenant is a restrictive covenant which touches and concerns the de-
fendant's land, and in substance, if not in form, there is privity of estate between the
plaintiff and the defendant." 278 N. Y. at 262, 15 N. E. (2d) at 798.
132. See Stone, The Equitable Mortgage in New York (1920) 20 CoL. L. RPv. 519, 523.
133. Id. at 527.
134. Cf. State Bank v. Lamoka Power Corporation, 269 N. Y. 1, 198 N. E. 609 (1935);
New York Security Co. v. Saratoga G. & El. Co., 159 N. Y. 137, 53 N. E. 753 (1399).
"The mortgage was not one of the sort dealt with in Zartman v. First National Bank, 189
N. Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907):' k; re Downtown Athletic Club, 18 F. Supp. 712, 716.
(S. D. N. Y. 1936).
135. See Kossoff v. Wald, 245 App. Div. 646, 656, 284 N. Y. Supp. 130, 136 (Ist Dep't
1935).
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of the premises and whether attached or not, of such nature as are
ordinarily supplied by a landlord, from going with the realty. Rights
of conditional vendors and chattel mortgagees are adequately protected
at present, and would not be impaired, in such cases where their priority
is now recognized, if the mortgage lien were limited to the owner's equity
in such articles. Real estate financing through trustees and lending in-
stitutions subject to similar investment limitations would be facilitated
if a proposed mortgagee could be assured that, in the event of a fore-
closure, he would obtain the real property in an immediately rentable
condition. 1- 6
It is hardly likely, in view of the attitude of the Court of Appeals in
the Madles case, that the scope of fixtures will be extensively broadened
by judicial legislation. The Peck-Schwartz case places in doubt the
status of unattached personalty under existing mortgages and lays down
technical requirements for future mortgages that will beset the general
practitioner no end. There is no reason, however, why the effect of the
after-acquired property clause cannot be- expanded by statute to fulfill
its literal promise.
This could be accomplished by amending Section 231 of the Lien
Law to read, insofar as is pertinent here, as follows:
"Mortgages creating a lien upon real and personal property, including after-
acquired property, executed as security for the payment of a bond or bonds
need not be filed or refiled as chattel mortgages."
136. If this is not true, the mortgagee must immediately upon foreclosure make an
additional investment, possibly in a substantial amount, before the property becomes
income-bearing. A trustee does not discharge his obligations in the making of mortgage
loans by compliance with the statutory requirements for legal investments; and such
compliance is no protection against surcharge for consequent loss if he fails to act pru-
dently. Matter of Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N. Y. Supp. 470 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd,
266 N. Y. 607, 195 N. E. 221 (1935). Matter of Young, 249 App. Div. 495, 293 N. Y.
Supp. 97 (1937), aff'd, 274 N. Y. 543, 10 N. E. (2d) 541 (1937). Trustees, making loans
within the statutory ratio of value, have been surcharged on the ground of inadequate
income at the time of the making of the mortgage [Matter of Dalsimer, 160 Misc. 906,
291 N. Y. Supp. 34, aff'd, 251 App. Div. 385, 296 N. Y. Supp. 209 (1st Dep't 1937);
Matter of Frank, 160 Misc. 903, 291 N. Y. Supp. 44 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Matter of Poillon,
163 Misc. 897, 902, 298 N. Y. Supp. 220, 222 (Surf. Ct. 1937)], although no statutory
provision lays down such a requirement and loans on inherent land value alone have long
been considered both safe and conservative. In fact, loans on entirely unimproved property
are expressly provided for though at a smaller value-ratio. N. Y. BAN INO LAW (1938)
§ 239(6.). If a mortgagee must make a substantial advance upon foreclosure, query,
whether in view of the foregoing a fiduciary, obligated by statute to invest 'only on un-
incumbered property, may invest in such mortgages. The prospective necessity of advances
by a mortgagee upon foreclosure has been held to be one of the elements properly cog-
nizable when valuing mortgages for the purpose of filing claims against mo1rtgage guar-
anty companies. Matter of New York Title & Mortgage Co., 277 N. Y. 66, 80, 13 N. E.
(2d) 41, 50 (1938).
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and by amending Section 254 of the Real Property Law, so far as is
here pertinent to read as follows:
"In mortgages of real property ... the following or similar clauses and
covenants must be construed as follows, 'the mortgagor hereby mortgages to
the mortgagee (description)' must be construed as equivalent in meaning to
the words, 'the said party of the first part ... doth hereby grant and release
unto the said party of the second part, and to his heirs (or successors) and
assigns forever (description), together with all the appurtenances, and all the
estate and rights of the party of the first part in and to said premises, together
with all fixtures and articles of personal property now or hereafter attached to,
or used in connection with, the premises; including, without limitation upon
the generality of the foregoing, so much of such fixtures and articles of personal
property, whether or not affixed or attached to said premises and whether
installed by the mortgagor or any other owner of said premises, as are custom-
arily placed in or upon similar premises by an owner thereof .... This pro-
vision shall bind and enure to the benefit of the parties thereto and their heirs,
successors or assigns ... "
